The position of the other countries towards Kosovo’s issue (Koha Ditore)

The following opinion piece is written by an analyst from an EU country whose name is known to the paper’s editorial staff. The full analysis was provided by Koha Ditore.

If we analyse positions of European member countries of EU and NATO towards the Kosovo issue the matters stand roughly as follows:

Romania is perhaps the most pro-Serb country in EU. One reason for Romania's resistance to measures and policies that further the position of minorities, would be due to the fact that such policies would legitimise claims of Hungarian minority in Romania, although there is no danger of secessionism of this minority due to its geographic disposition. Another reason would be that Romania fear that Kosovo’s independence would lead to a secession of Transdniestria region from Moldova, which is considered in Bucharest a second Romanian state.

Slovakia supports Serbia on the Kosovo issue, as a part of Slavic solidarity, but maybe even more because of its problems with the Hungarian minority, accounting roughly for over 10% of its population, living along the border with Hungary. For this reason, Slovakia is opposed to any precedent in favour of minorities, fearing repercussions at home. Like Serbia, Slovakia acquired this Hungarian-populated area as a result of war following the World War I and lost this territory to Hungary in 1938 following the Munich Agreement as a result of imposition of the then-European powers. Now, some Slovak politicians make comparison between Serbia's possible loss of Kosova against its will and their fate in 1938 and they insist that Serbia must
agree with any solution for Kosovo.

Greece has memories of an alliance with Serbia in the Balkans and during the World Wars. It is dependent on Serbia in regard to transiting its territory en route to Western Europe and there are anti-Albanian sentiments existing in Greece. For all these reasons this country cannot be expected to be among supporters of Kosovo, yet it must be said that so far Greece has shown more reserve and a less pro-Serb attitude than expected. Cyprus, as another Greek state, has taken a similar stand on Kosovo's issue as Greece and it is expected to be following the example of Greece also in the future. The case of its Turkish republic of Northern Cyprus is so different from Kosovo's one and it does not influence Cyprus' stand on Kosovo's issue.

Spain has reservations regarding Kosovo’s independence due to its fear of Kosovo's independence legitimising secessionist aspirations in its Basque and Catalan regions. Currently, the idea of secession does not enjoy a majority in any of these two regions, however, they fear this could change in the future.

The Czech Republic has currently a rather neutral position towards Kosovo. In the past, during the previous government, its policy could be characterised as pro-Serb, although former President Vaclav Havel supported Kosovo and opposed Serbia during the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Serbs try to win Czech support by making comparisons between their current position vis-à-vis Kosova and Czech position vis-à- vis Sudetenland region in 1938. They also play on the Pan-Slavic solidarity that in the Czech Republic, unlike in Poland, has positive connotations, and on positive remembrances of Czech-Serb and Czech-Yugoslav co-operation in the past.

Position of Poland towards Kosovo is not clear. There were contradicting statements of Polish officials on this issue. During the meeting with the Albanian President, Polish President Lech Kaczyinski in November last year allegedly backed a free and independent Kosovo, while at a meeting with its Romanian counterpart in February this year, Mr Kaczyinski supported Kosovo's autonomy within Serbia because Kosovo's independence would, according to him, endanger integrity of other countries like Georgia. Poland has no domestic reasons to oppose Kosovo's independence; it has no minorities, the notion of Pan-Slavic solidarity is unpopular in Poland due to its associations with Russian hegemony. However, two elements work in Albanian favour when it comes to the Polish stand: historically entrenched Polish animosity towards Russia (remark on Georgia effectively means that Poland dislikes strengthening Russia as a result of annexation of Georgian territory) and Orthodox Christianity in general; also, there is a great friendship between Poland and the US.

Bulgaria has also taken a neutral stand on Kosovo's issue. On the one hand, Bulgarians have a very negative historic remembrance of Serbs. Both countries waged four wars between 1885 and 1945 and in Bulgaria Serbs are universally blamed for having stolen Macedonia, which is considered historically and ethnically Bulgarian land. Possible negative effects of Kosovo's independence on stability and integrity of Macedonia is, on the other hand, the main reason why Bulgaria is wary of Kosovo's independence. The other reason is Bulgaria's dependence on transport routes through Serbia towards Western Europe.

Like Bulgarians, Hungarians are also historical adversaries of Serbs. Hungarians have also shared with Albanians the historical experience of dismemberment of their ethnic lands – after World War I large numbers of Hungarians ended up as national minorities in the neighbouring countries. These elements work in favour of Hungarian support of Kosovo, yet Hungary also does not want to expose the Hungarian minority in Serbia by taking Kosovo’s side too openly.

Kosovars could get strong supporters for their cause in three new Baltic states – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia by pointing to their similar historical experience. All three states were annexed by the Soviet Union against their will in 1940, restored independence in 1991 and anti-Russian sentiments run high in all of them, particularly in Latvia and Estonia.

Finland is the country with similar negative experiences in its relations with Russia. However, unlike the three new Baltic states, Finland has been trying to avoid an outright anti-Russian stand in its foreign policy. This is a leftover from the Cold War era when such a Finnish attitude was a condition for survival of this state.

Among other Scandinavian countries, Denmark, with its close relations with Great Britain and the US, is the most supportive towards Kosovar aspirations. Iceland has a tradition of quick recognition of newly-established states (as in case of Baltic states, Slovenia, Croatia and Montenegro last year). Sweden has also no reason to oppose Kosovo's independence, although the current Foreign Minister Carl Bildt showed in several statements over the last years that he was not a friend of Kosovo, although he didn't support Serbs either.

Norway is one of the most pro-Serb countries in the West. Its Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg uttered its opposition to Kosovo's independence on one occasion, saying that this would “open a Pandora’s Box”. Norway was the first foreign country visited by Vojislav Kostunica after the downfall of Slobodan Milosevic and after the false “democratic revolution” in Belgrade it quickly reallocated to Serbia the funds previously earmarked for Kosovo, saying that this was also in Kosovo’s interest. When Norway was a non-permanent member of the UN SC several years ago, the pro-Serb statements of its representative stood out. It’s no surprise that the Norwegian envoy Kai Eide made two very biased pro-Serb reports in 2004 and 2005. When asked for the reasons for this closeness between Norway and Serbia one Norwegian diplomat said that this a result of the ties established during World War II when escaped Yugoslav prisoners were active in the Norwegian resistance movement against the Nazi occupation.

Benelux countries are among the more friendly disposed EU countries towards an independent Kosovo. Netherlands is persistently opposed to granting concessions to Serbia, mainly because of the first hand experience of the Dutch peacekeepers in Srebrenica. Belgium is also opposed to indulging Serbia when it comes to Belgrade’s co-operation with the Hague Tribunal.

Slovenia is a country trying to steer its policy between the sympathy for Kosovar aspirations and economic interests in Serbia. There were huge Slovene investments in Serbia in the recent years and this economic reason influence against a too outright support for Kosovo's independence, although the incumbent Prime Minister and the President are known to have publicly supported Kosovo's independence as early as in 1998.

Croatia has also avoided to declare its position towards Kosovo, although it is known that public opinion there supports independence of Kosovo. Prime Minister Ivo Sanader said on several occasions that Belgrade must agree with any solution on Kosovo’s status and this was an apparent attempt to use Kosovo for improving Croatian-Serb relations. On the other hand, Kosovo’s Prime Minister Agim Çeku was very satisfied with his recent visit to Croatia.

Bosnia, or rather Bosniaks, have an ambivalent stand towards Kosovo. Bosniaks are probably the greatest potential ally of Albanians. On the other hand, Bosniaks more or less secretly oppose Kosovo’s independence, because they fear secession of Republika Srpska (RS) in this case. They and the internationals as well cannot understand that Serbs are going to pursue this policy in Bosnia regardless of what happens in Kosovo.

As to the stand of Montenegro, Albanians could be satisfied if this stand is going to be as it has been so far. Due to many historic, ethnic and other links between Montenegro and Serbia, a neutral position by Montenegro towards Kosovo’s problem is the most that can be expected.

Macedonia’s position towards Kosovo’s problem is complex. On the one hand ethnic Macedonians fear that Kosovo’s independence could lead to problems because of Albanian secessionism. On the other hand, they are aware that reestablishment of Belgrade’s control of entire Kosovo is not likely. The most what they fear is partition of Kosovo as a precedent for Macedonia’s partition and Macedonian diplomacy takes great pains to prevent this kind of outcome of Kosovo’s status. In this respect, Macedonians are allies of Kosovars. It can be said that the main reason why the international community (IC) has so far opposed Kosovo’s partition is the fear of destabilisation of Macedonia.

Germany wants to serve as a “bridge” between the West (or rather, the US) and Russia. Albanians should try to get German understanding by making parallels between the position of Kosovo and the position of the Sudetenland region. However, they should be careful to make this comparison only in personal contacts with German politicians and opinion-makers, because public comparisons of this kind would be counter-productive in the countries that won World War II.

Austria will probably take a stand similar to that of Germany. Austrian historical experiences with Serbia are negative (Serbian role in assassination of Habsburg heir to the throne Prince Ferdinand in 1914 and ensuing break-up of Habsburg monarchy), while Albanian historical experiences with Austria are positive, because Austria- Hungary decisively contributed to the withdrawal of Serbian troops from northern Albania in the First Balkan War that led to the establishment of an Albanian state. The element working against Austria’s support of Kosovo is Austrian economic interests in the Danube region that includes also Serbia.

Switzerland was the first country declaring itself in favour of an independent Kosovo. The presence of large numbers of Kosovars and other Albanians in this country probably contributed to this stand. On the one hand, these Albanians influenced Swiss opinion. On the other hand, Swiss fear that a non-independent status of Kosovo would bring even more Albanians to this country, while independence would lead to repatriation of some of them.

Italy, as an important EU, NATO and Contact Group member, is not opposed to independent Kosovo, yet due to its economic and geopolitical interests in the Balkans it wants to retain also good relations with Serbia and it is thus seeking a formula that would prevent too big a disappointment in Serbia regarding the outcome of Kosovo’s status. In tiny EU member state Malta Kosovars could perhaps find support by pointing out to common efforts of both peoples to preserve their identity and achieve independence.

France has shown more understanding for the Kosovar position and greater distance from Serbia than expected. It’s possible that the outcome of the Presidential elections in May this year in France will influence the stand of this country towards Kosovo. The likely winner of these elections, according to the newest opinion polls, Nicolas Sarkozy, is known as being close to the US (not a widespread position in France), and his victory could result in an even more supportive stance of France towards Kosovo’s independence.

Great Britain is the biggest supporter of Kosovo since 1998. It has spoken out in favour of military intervention against Serbia as early as in June 1998 exerting influence on Washington to decide in favour of military action, it was the only country willing to commit its troops for the ground invasion during the NATO air campaign in 1999 and it is the Contact Group member which is the most supportive to Kosovo’s independence. Credit for such a British stance goes to Prime Minister Tony Blair who will resign this year. The question is now what stand his likely successor Gordon Brown will take who is reportedly less close to the US and closer to EU than Mr Blair. A turnaround in the British position is certainly out of question, yet some modifications are possible. It’s possible that a somewhat less warm British attitude towards Kosovo would be compensated with a more sympathetic stance of France in case of Sarkozy’s victory.

Ireland is also the country in which Kosovars could find an ally for their cause, because of similar historical experiences. This is a neutral country with not much influence in international relations, yet as an EU member its support can come in useful.

Portugal is the country whose stand towards Kosovo is not known. As in many other countries it was probably assessed that the Kosovo issue is not so important for them to take its own stand on it and it’s better to follow the prevailing stand in the IC. Despite this seeming lack of its own opinion, Portugal as a NATO member took part in the intervention of 1999.

If the positions of EU members towards Kosovo are summed up, they run across the spectrum from pro-Serb to pro-Kosovar sympathies. However, for no EU member country is the Kosovo issue so important so as to ruin the common EU policy on this matter. Although the most important decisions in EU are made by consensus it is not likely that any country will lodge a veto to block decisions it does not agree with and ultimately all of them will follow the policy shaped by the main players – the US and the largest and most influential EU member countries. The same is the case with NATO.

As to the other European and Eurasian countries, Russia and Belarus completely take the Serb side. Ukraine is more guarded, yet it is essentially also against independent Kosovo because it fears repercussions in the post-Soviet area, including the possibility of ethnic Russian secessionism in Ukraine itself. Turkey is an important state in NATO as well as an influential one in the Islamic world. Its position towards Kosovo’s problem is ambivalent. On the one hand, Turkey opposes policies favouring the interests of minorities, least of all the right to secession, because of its Kurdish problem and this element makes Turkey opposed to Kosovar independence. On the other hand, Turkey has interests in the Balkans and Muslim populations in the region Islamised by the Ottoman Empire are seen as natural bases for Turkish influence in the region. In this respect, the vision of the Kosovar state with Muslim majority and special relations with Turkey could be the reason for Turkish support for Kosovo’s independence. It’s known that Turkey acts as a patron of Bosniaks, yet it’s difficult to see Turks in the same position when it comes to Kosovar Albanians because the position of Bosniaks and Albanians is not the same. Not only because not all Albanians are Muslims but even more because the history of both peoples and their attitude towards the Ottoman period are different. For having Turkish support it is necessary for Kosovars to do their best that Kosovo Turks feel at home in Kosovo.

In the underdeveloped world of Asia, Africa and Central and South America, Kosovars should try to enlist support for their cause by drawing a parallel between their struggle for independence and the decolonisation process in the Third World during which their countries became independent. More than 50 countries - members of the Islamic conference - could be the first to recognise the independence of Kosovo. Pakistan, a very influential Islamic country, is a known supporter of an independent Kosovo. Egyptian support could be enlisted by reminding Egyptians of Muhammad Ali, an ethnic Albanian and founder of modern Egypt. Kosovars have every right to play on Islamic solidarity for getting international support, yet this should be done in a discreet way so as not to provide ammunition to those enemies who portray an independent Kosovo as a future Al-Qaeda stronghold in Europe, etc. On the other hand, Kosovars could make use of the fear of Islamic extremism in the West by exerting pressure on the Western countries. It should be told to the West that non-recognition of independent Kosovo could push some disappointed Kosovars into the hands of Islamic extremists and weaken pro-European forces among Kosovars. It is the same what Belgrade’s government is doing; they say that granting independence to Kosovo would weaken “democratic forces” in Serbia and strengthen radicals.

Debunking Serbian “legal” arguments against Kosova’s independence
Serbs are trying to discredit efforts for an independent Kosovo by presenting it as a secession – a generally unpopular term in the world. Albanians should respond by pointing out that this secession is a result of illegitimate Serbian annexation – even a more hated term in the world. The fact of the matter is that Serbia conquered and annexed Kosova in 1912-13 without obtaining consent of Kosovo’s population for that act. There was no referendum in which Kosovo’s inhabitants would endorse this annexation and for this reason this annexation lacked legitimate basis. Subsequent endorsement of this annexation by the then-European Great Powers perhaps afforded legality but in no way could afford legitimacy to the violent conquest and annexation of Kosova by Serbia. Kosovar struggle for independence can be compared with the struggle for independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia or East Timor from Indonesia. Both these two areas (Eritrea was Italian, East Timor was a Portuguese possession) were annexed by neighbouring countries without consulting the population of these two areas whether they supported this annexation. Ethiopian annexation of Eritrea was de-jure internationally recognised (in fact, UN allocated Eritrea to Ethiopia in 1952), while Indonesian annexation of East Timor in 1975 was de-facto and partly also de- jure internationally recognised. In both annexed territories a liberation war for independence broke out. Ethiopian and Indonesian regimes tried to enlist international support for the continuation of annexation by talking about the wars of secession instead, knowing that “secession” is a dirty word in most of the world. Of course, it was a war of secession if annexation is disregarded. Today, both Eritrea and East Timor are independent countries after democratic forces which had overthrown dictatorial regimes in both countries, recognised the right to self-determination in both annexed areas. This fact undermines the often repeated statement of Serbian leaders that no country voluntarily gives up part of its territory. Peace agreements in Sudan and Papua-New Guinea also provided for a popular referendum to decide the political status of secessionist-minded areas in both countries (southern Sudan and the island of Bougainville respectively).

In trying to perpetuate its control of Kosovo, Belgrade now refers to the rules of international law barring alterations of state borders without consent of concerned state. However, Belgrade itself brutally violated these same rules through an aggression against the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman borders were altered 1912 in favour of Serbia without the consent of the Ottoman Empire. Belgrade thus refers to the same rules that it once violated. The basic difference between these two alterations of borders is that the alteration of Serbia’s borders resulting from Kosovo’s secession from Serbia would be based on the respect of people’s will, while alteration of Serbia’s borders in 1913 was based on disrespect of people’s will. The Kosovo’s problem exists now because in 1913 an illegitimate change of international state borders took place resulting in Serbian annexation of Kosovo. Had the principle of inviolability of state borders been respected by Serbia in 1912-13, Kosovo’s problem would not exist today.

Serbs try to justify annexation of Kosovo in 1913 by saying they only “recovered” Kosovo from the Ottoman Empire that had taken Kosovo from the medieval Serbian state in the 15th century. This kind of justification is wrong for several reasons. At first, there is fundamental difference between the modern Serbian state that arose in 19th century and medieval pre-Ottoman Serbia. In the 19th century a nation-state of Serb people arose, a state of Serbs and for Serbs. On the other hand, Serbia which existed between 12th and 15th century was not a nation-state but a dynastic state. The members of the ruling dynasty were Serbs in an ethnic sense (the meaning of this term was then different than today) but the population as a whole was not differentiated by an ethnic principle and there was even no ethnic consciousness as we know today. Secondly, medieval Serbia comprised some areas that modern Serbia doesn’t want to “recover”, as it is the case with Macedonia’s capital of Skopje that was also a capital of that state. Thirdly, if the modern Serbian state is a successor of the medieval one, how is it possible that Serbia today includes Vojvodina that was never part of medieval Serbia.

There are no legitimate grounds for Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo, while legal ones are extremely tenuous. The most important argument in Serb hands is London’s Treaty of 30 May 1913 under which Serbian sovereignty over most of Kosovo (westernmost part of Kosovo was then placed under Montenegro’s sovereignty) was internationally recognised. Yet even this illegitimate document can be challenged on legal grounds. The Treaty of Berlin of 13 July 1878 incorporated provisions for protection of minorities, which served as a model for the Minorities System that was subsequently established within the framework of the League of Nations. Serbia completely flouted these provisions by expelling virtually all Albanians from the newly acquired territories in today’s southern Serbia. Before it acquired international recognition of its occupation of Kosova in 1912, Serbia had promised fair treatment of Albanians and Muslims. Despite the Serbian record from 1878, the Great Powers trusted Serbian promises and sanctioned its annexation of Kosovo. When Serbs talk about international law that allegedly guarantees sovereignty and territorial integrity of internationally recognised states, they forget to mention that this international law contains also provisions on human rights and self-determination. And when the Great Powers recognised the illegitimate Serbian conquest of Albanian-populated lands in 1878 and in 1913, Serbia also took some obligations concerning respect of human rights of the population in the newly-annexed territories. Albanians should present these documents from 1878 and 1913 to the Contact Group members. It’s an irrefutable fact that Serbia didn’t respect minority rights obligations in these documents and NATO presence in Kosovo is only one piece of evidence for that and this disrespect of its obligations represents valid legal grounds for abolishment of sovereignty accorded to Serbia in these documents.

The value of the international support in light of Ahtisaari’s Plan.
Outside Europe, the US is the most important supporter of Kosovo’s independence. However, American support is not unconditional and there are also opponents of independent Kosovo in the public and political life in the US. Moreover, it seems that Albanians sometimes overestimate the importance of this support and foreign support in general. The US’ support is only political, the US won’t wage another war for Kosovo. The leverage to influence Serbia’s behaviour is weak, because the West has only “carrots” at its disposal, it has renounced the use of “sticks” against Serbia. This is the basic difference between the situation now and in 1999, when Serbs had to choose between accepting the Rambouillet package and NATO bombing. Serbs have no reason to fear any punitive measures if they refuse Ahtisaari’s or any other international proposal unfavourable for them. On the other hand, IC has a strong leverage to influence Kosovar behaviour. Of course, there will be no punitive measures as well in case of Kosovar refusal of the international proposal, their main leverage is withdrawal of international forces in Kosovo and leaving Kosovo at the mercy of Serbs. It would have been better for Albanians not to insist on addressing the status’ issue without being confident in their ability to defend Kosovo.

Ahtisaari's plan is more favourable for Kosovo than expected, yet it is still much less than Kosovo needs and deserves. Its main good point is abolishment of Serbia's sovereignty over Kosovo, yet this doesn't mean it guarantees international recognition of independent Kosovo, at least not during ICR's supervision and even less on Kosovo's entire territory. On the contrary. Under Ahtisaari's plan, Serbs would consolidate their control in eastern Kosovo. The new municipality of Ranillug would shift de-facto Kosovo's border with Serbia for more than 10 km on the Gjilan-Bujanoc road, while enlargement of Novoberda municipality would extend Serbia even further inside Kosovo. Kosovar leadership made a big mistake by failing to populate the abandoned Serb villages of Mozgove and Dragance with displaced Albanians from northern Mitrovica, like Serbs were doing on a large scale in northern Mitrovica. Mozgove, once having 70 Serbs, was partly repopulated with 10 Serb returnees in 2003, while Dragance is still mostly empty. By populating these two villages with Albanians, Serb villages in an enlarged municipality of Novoberda would be separated from Ranillug municipality and thus territorial integrity of Kosovo in this area protected. Instead of this, Ahtisaari's plan incorporated even the Albanian village of Makresh i Ulet into an expanded Novoberda municipality thus better connecting Serb- controlled area in eastern Kosova and directly endangering Albanian inhabitants of this village. Kosovar leaders are obviously unable to understand that the best way for protecting Kosovo's integrity is making barriers in the form of an Albanian-populated space between Serb-populated settlements and Serbia. Establishment of new Serb- majority municipalities does not endanger Kosovo if these municipalities are surrounded by Albanian-populated territory and thus territorially separated from Serbia regardless of what competencies and “horizontal links” these municipalities have. Serbs know better the importance of demographic policy as their current plan to construct new housing for Serbs in strategically important mixed village of Berivojce near Dardana shows.

As the matters stand, however, it does not seem likely that this plan will be ever realised. Namely, it will be difficult for Russia to renege on its announcements it will veto any UN Security Council (UN SC) resolution on Kosovo which is unacceptable for Serbia. Russian representatives have been repeating this stand so persistently that their turnaround without getting some major concession from the West (like the green light for annexation of secessionist republics in Georgia), which is not in sight, would cause losing face for them. Therefore, the most probable scenario is that Ahtisaari's plan in its final form will flounder in the UN SC not being able to overcome Russian veto. There were many international proposals and plans in the last 16 years for the resolution of crisis in the former Yugoslavia which came to nothing and Ahtisaari's one perhaps even won't be the last of them experiencing this fate. It's no secret that Serbs see their chance here. They expect that failure of Ahtisaari's plan will mark the launching of a new process of finding a solution for Kosovo in which some premises
(as those forbidding partition) will be re-examined so as to make a solution acceptable for Belgrade and passable in the UN SC. They also hope that Albanians will become nervous repeating the violence of March 2004, which would provide Serbs with a pretext for invasion on Kosovo, which would produce a definite partition of Kosovo far more favourable for Serbs than any negotiated or internationally imposed partition.

Serb expectations are correct. In the absence of will to compel Serbs into accepting Ahtisaari’s plan, the internationals will have to offer more to Serbs in order to receive their consent. There are two possible options. If a resolution is going to be sought only in Kosovo, the international efforts to obtain Serb approval will be inevitably at the Albanian expense. The only way to prevent making necessary concessions to Serbs at the expense of Kosovars is including other countries into Kosovo’s equation. This means offering territories in Bosnia (Republika Srpska) to Serbia in order to “buy” Serbian acceptance of the international plan for Kosovo. So far, nobody in IC wants to consider this option. The internationals think it would be unfair to “sacrifice” another country in order to solve Kosovo’s problem not realising that Bosnia-Herzegovina is clinically dead and was sacrificed in 1992-95 when the world refused to militarily intervene against Serb aggression and which is now artificially sustained only by the international tutelage and regardless of how the Kosovo issue is going to be resolved this country will collapse very quickly after departure of international administrators.